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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
settled the fate of a dog named Brody, who was put on “Doggie 
Death Row”2 by the City of Lino Lakes, Minnesota, in 2010 after he 
injured three people—biting at least two of the three.3 The 
supreme court held that Brody’s owner, Sawh, had no procedural 
due process right to a hearing on the City’s first designation of 
Brody as “potentially dangerous,” because the City could not 
restrict or deprive Sawh’s property interest in Brody at the time of 
the designation.4 The court also held the potentially dangerous 
designation simply functioned as a warning rather than a predicate 
to subsequently designate Brody “dangerous” and order his 
destruction.5 
Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes is not a case about a dog; it is about 
whether the government may issue a warning giving an individual 
notice that he or she is not in accordance with the law, and then 
use the mere existence of the warning as a predicate offense in a 
subsequent charge, without giving the individual a chance to refute 
the correctness of the issuance of the warning. While the 
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled this result does not offend the 
Due Process Clause, this note argues to the contrary. 
 
 1.  Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes (Sawh II), 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012). 
 2.  Brief and Appendix of Respondent/Cross-Appellant Mitchell Sawh, 
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012) (No. A10-2143), 2011 WL 9974680, at *20 
[hereinafter Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief] (describing Brody’s confinement as 
“Doggie Death Row”). 
 3.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630–31. The parties and courts disagreed on 
whether the first incident was a bite. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 4.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 632. 
 5.  Id. at 635. 
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This note begins by discussing the history of the Due Process 
Clause, cases involving procedural due process rights, and the 
history of Minnesota’s “dangerous dog” laws.6 The note then 
discusses the facts of Sawh, and the opinions issued by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court.7 
This note primarily argues that while the Minnesota Supreme 
Court correctly determined Sawh had no procedural due process 
right to a hearing at the time Brody was designated “potentially 
dangerous,” Sawh had a due process right to a post hoc hearing on 
the correctness of the potentially dangerous designation because 
the designation was used as a predicate to later deprive Sawh of his 
property.8 This note also argues that the supreme court in Sawh 
erred in minimizing Sawh’s property interest in his dog, Brody, by 
determining the value of a dog is measured by its “fair market 
value.”9 
II. HISTORY 
A. Origins and Principles of the Due Process Clause 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution prohibit the federal government and the states, 
respectively, from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”10 The Minnesota State Constitution has 
an identical due process provision,11 which provides identical 
protections as the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.12 
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court is only bound by the 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as to what the Due Process 
Clause prohibits,13 and “may interpret the Minnesota Constitution 
 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 10.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally 2 RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.2, at 803 
(5th ed. 2012) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to ensure 
that former slaves were not deprived of newly gained freedoms from the states). 
 11.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law.”). 
 12.  Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988) (citing 
Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948)). 
 13.  7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.01, at 341 (4th ed. 
1990) (citing State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 20–21, 110 N.W.2d 514, 522–23 
(1961)). 
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to afford more protection than provided under the U.S. 
Constitution.”14 
The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Due Process Clause as 
imposing two limits on government: procedural due process and 
substantive due process.15 Procedural due process refers to the 
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives 
someone of life, liberty, or property.16 Substantive due process “asks 
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a 
person’s life, liberty, or property.”17 This note is only concerned 
with procedural due process, specifically in relation to property 
rights. 
Since the Due Process Clause’s origin in the Magna Carta in 
1215, the requirement for “due process of law” has meant to 
prohibit the state from conducting arbitrary proceedings and to 
require certain procedures to ensure fairness.18 Procedural due 
process at its core requires notice and an opportunity to be heard 
“at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”19 Its essence 
ensures individuals will be protected by rudimentary requirements 
of “fair play.”20 The Due Process Clause is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.21 
For example, depending on the circumstances, constitutionally 
sufficient due process can range from the full panoply of trial rights 
in a criminal proceeding to an informal hearing to review a school 
disciplinary decision.22 
 
 14.  State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1999) (citing PruneYard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)). 
 15.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.1, at 557 (4th ed. 2013). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 558. 
 18.  See MAGNA CARTA § 39 (1215) (“No Freeman shall be taken, imprisoned 
or disseized . . . unless by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the 
land.”); JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 7–8 (2003) (explaining how “law of 
the land” became synonymous with “due process of law”). For a general history of 
the Due Process Clause, see LUCIUS POLK MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1906); ORTH, supra; RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS (Jack Stark ed., 2004). 
 19.  Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Grannis v. Ordean, 
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.1, at 558. 
 20.  Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); accord Juster Bros. v. Christgau, 
214 Minn. 108, 119, 7 N.W.2d 501, 507–08 (1943). 
 21.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); accord Brooks v. Comm’r 
of Pub. Safety, 584 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 22.  E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (approving the use of an 
informal hearing to review a decision to suspend a student). 
4
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B. From New Property to the Mathews Balancing Test 
After the New Deal and the growth of the administrative state 
disbursing new benefits to its citizenry, the Supreme Court 
grappled with the question of what constitutes a property interest 
that triggers the Due Process Clause.23 
Before the 1970s the U.S. Supreme Court maintained a 
categorical distinction between a property right and a privilege: 
“If an individual owned some object of value like a house or car, he 
had a property ‘right’ protected from arbitrary government 
deprivation by Due Process.”24 A government bestowed “privilege” 
did not require the government to provide due process.25 In 1892 
then-state court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes illustrated the 
right/privilege distinction in a case where a police officer was fired 
from his job for expressing unpopular views: “The petitioner may 
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”26 The U.S. Supreme Court 
followed Holmes’s lead, finding that an individual had no due 
process rights “if a person was fired from a government job, or had 
government benefits terminated or had an occupational license 
revoked.”27 
In the 1960s Professor Charles Reich argued that with the 
growth of the administrative state, a variety of new forms of 
government wealth were created, which Reich labeled as “new 
property.”28 Reich wrote that society today is built around 
state-granted entitlements, such as public education, Social 
Security, occupational licenses, and welfare benefits.29 By the 1960s, 
society no longer viewed these entitlements as gratuities or charity, 
 
 23.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.2, at 572–75. 
 24.  RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.3.1a, 
at 235 (4th ed. 2004). 
 25.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 569. 
 26.  McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892), 
cited in PIERCE ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.3.1a, at 235. 
 27.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 569 (citing Fleming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603 (1960) (government benefits); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 
451 (1954) (occupational license); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) 
(government job)); see also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 17.2, at 5–9. 
 28.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 571; see Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter Reich, New Property]; see also Charles 
A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 
1245 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Individual Rights]. 
 29.  Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 28, at 1255. 
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but rather as fully deserved essentials.30 Reich argued that because 
government benefits hold the same place in a person’s life 
traditionally occupied by property, sufficient due process is 
required upon their termination or restriction.31 
In 1970 the U.S. Supreme Court repudiated its right/privilege 
distinction in Goldberg v. Kelly.32 Citing Reich’s law review articles, 
the Court in Goldberg recognized that welfare benefits were a 
property right affording the recipient an evidentiary hearing before 
those benefits were terminated.33 Because the Court recognized 
“statutory entitlement[s]” as a new source of property implicating 
the Due Process Clause, the Goldberg opinion triggered a “due 
process explosion.”34 Expanding the modern meaning of property, 
the Court subsequently found that certain state-granted benefits, 
such as food stamps,35 public employment,36 driver’s licenses,37 and 
professional licenses,38 were potentially property, thus triggering 
the Due Process Clause and a right to some sort of hearing before 
deprivation.39 
Given that these new forms of property recognized by the 
Supreme Court may vary in weight and importance, in the 1970s 
the Court set up a two-question analysis to determine how much 
and what type of procedural due process is required.40 
The first question the Court asks is a threshold determination: 
has a state action deprived or restricted a person’s life, liberty, or 
property interest?41 In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 7.3.1, at 571. 
 32.  397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 33.  Id. at 262. See generally 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 17.2, at 5 
(stating that hearings and processes are owed when government action impairs an 
individual’s property); Reich, New Property, supra note 28, at 733 (stating that 
valuables dispensed by the government supplant traditional forms of private 
property wealth). 
 34.  CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 75 (Marlin Volz 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997); see Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. 
 35.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262. 
 36.  Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–600 (1972). But see Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (finding a state college 
professor had no property interest where the employment contract was for only 
one year). 
 37.  Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
 38.  Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
 39.  3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 10, § 17.2, at 6–8. 
 40.  See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 
 41.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70; cf. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Elk River Ready 
Mix Co., 430 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a person was not 
6
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Court held that to have a property interest in a benefit, a person 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it—”[h]e must, 
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”42 
The second question the Court asks is whether the procedures 
used by the state to deprive a person’s property were 
constitutionally sufficient.43 The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge44 
created a three-part balancing test to determine the constitutional 
sufficiency of the procedures.45 The Court balances: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.46 
Professor Richard J. Pierce criticizes the Mathews test for two 
related reasons. First, Pierce notes that in determining the weight 
of the private interest, the Mathews test requires each judge to 
insert his or her subjective view concerning the relative value of 
hundreds of incomparable interests.47 Such interests, for example, 
could range from welfare benefits to a household pet. Second, 
Professor Pierce notes that because each judge may put different 
values on various liberty and property interests and the value of 
additional procedures, the result of the application of the Mathews 
balancing test can be unpredictable.48 
Despite these criticisms, the Mathews test has shown to be 
durable and flexible. Since 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court has 
employed the test in deciding matters as practical as how long a city 
may delay holding a hearing after a person’s car is towed.49 On the 
 
subjected to a deprivation of property where a notice was purely informational). 
 42.  Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The court in Roth upheld its repudiation of the 
right/privilege distinction and ruled that majestic terms like “liberty” and 
“property” must be given some meaning. Id. at 571–72. 
 43.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  PIERCE ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.3.4d, at 275. 
 48.  Id. at 276. Despite these criticisms Professor Pierce prefers the Mathews 
test to any alternative that has been identified to date. Id.; see infra notes 150–54 
and accompanying text. 
 49.  See City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716 (2003). 
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other end of the spectrum, the Court has also used the test to 
decide national security matters as imperative as how much 
procedure is due to suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists held at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.50 
C. Dangerous Dog Laws in Minnesota 
The majority of states now regulate dogs through dangerous 
dog statutes.51 Minnesota’s dangerous dog statute, which was passed 
in 1988,52 was a reaction to several vicious dog bite incidents in the 
state.53 The law, like other dangerous dog statutes around the 
country, seemed to be a preventive measure to identify dogs before 
they bite people.54 
Minnesota Statutes section 347.50 defines a “dangerous dog” 
as any dog that has: 
(1) without provocation, inflicted substantial bodily harm 
on a human being on public or private property; 
(2) killed a domestic animal without provocation while off 
the owner’s property; or 
(3) been found to be potentially dangerous, and after the 
owner has notice that the dog is potentially dangerous, 
the dog aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety 
of humans or domestic animals.55 
A “potentially dangerous dog” is defined as any dog that: 
 
 50.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
 51.  Cynthia A. Mcneely & Sarah A. Lindquist, Dangerous Dog Laws: Failing to 
Give Man’s Best Friend a Fair Shake at Justice, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 99, 112 (2007) 
(discussing commonly shared characteristics of states’ dangerous dog laws). 
 52.  Act approved May 4, 1988, ch. 711, 1988 Minn. Laws 1645 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 347.50–565 (2012)). 
 53.  Dennis J. McGrath, Son’s Injury Led Woman to Seek Dog Legislation, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 5, 1988, at B1, available at 1988 WLNR 1657941 
(describing the pit bull mauling of a six-year-old boy and his mother’s efforts to 
lobby the Minnesota Legislature). 
 54.  DAVID FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS 181 (2008) 
(noting that in the 1970s state legislatures began to pass dangerous dog statutes as 
preventive measures); Ellen Foley, Officials Preparing a Hearing on Pit Bull that Bit St. 
Paul Boy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 29, 1987, at B3, available at 1987 WLNR 
1363674 (“[H]ealth officials are eagerly awaiting the passage of a proposed dog-
control ordinance that could identify dangerous dogs before they bite people.”). 
A more complete account of the legislative intent behind Minnesota’s dangerous 
dog statute is not possible because audio recordings of the Minnesota Legislature 
floor debates and committee hearings prior to the year 1991 are not available. 
 55.  MINN. STAT. § 347.50, subdiv. 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
8
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(1) when unprovoked, inflicts bites on a human or 
domestic animal on public or private property; 
(2) when unprovoked, chases or approaches a person, 
including a person on a bicycle, upon the streets, 
sidewalks, or any public or private property, other than 
the dog owner’s property, in an apparent attitude of 
attack; or 
(3) has a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to 
attack unprovoked, causing injury or otherwise 
threatening the safety of humans or domestic animals.56 
Once a dog has been declared “dangerous” by an animal 
control authority, its owner is required to follow a number of 
restrictions, such as registering the dog, posting visible signs 
warning the public of a dangerous dog, and obtaining liability 
insurance of at least $300,000.57 A person that does not comply with 
these restrictions is guilty of a misdemeanor, and any subsequent 
offenses are charged as gross misdemeanors.58 
Under Minnesota Statutes section 347.541, an owner of any 
dog declared “dangerous” has the right to notice and a hearing by 
an impartial hearing officer.59 An owner also has the right to a 
hearing when an animal control authority orders a dog to be 
euthanized in the event of a subsequent offense after the 
dangerous dog designation.60 
Finally, the Minnesota Legislature enabled any city or county 
to regulate potentially dangerous and dangerous dogs in a more 
 
 56.  Id. § 347.50, subdiv. 3. 
 57.  Id. § 347.51. 
 58.  Id. § 347.55(a), (c). In Minnesota, a misdemeanor has a sentence of up 
to ninety days in jail, a $1000 fine, or both. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 3. A gross 
misdemeanor has a sentence of up to one year in jail, a $3,000 fine, or both. 
Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 4. Under Minnesota law a person may also be convicted of a 
crime for not following the restrictions placed on his or her dog deemed 
“potentially dangerous” under the statute. Id. § 347.515 (providing an owner of a 
potentially dangerous dog must have a microchip implanted in the dog); 
id. § 347.55(a) (providing that it is a misdemeanor to violate a provision of section 
347.515). Even though the statute places restrictions on a potentially dangerous 
dog, the dog’s owner has no right to challenge the potentially dangerous 
designation that served as a predicate—as there need be no hearing to determine 
the validity of the potentially dangerous designation under the statute. 
See id. § 347.541, subdiv. 1, 4; cf. State v. Cowan, 814 N.E.2d 846, 848–50 (Ohio 
2004) (finding an ordinance unconstitutional where an unreviewable vicious dog 
designation was used as an element of a “failing to confine a vicious dog” criminal 
offense). 
 59.  MINN. STAT. § 347.541, subdiv. 1–3. 
 60.  Id. § 347.54, subdiv. 3. 
9
Mishek: Constitutional Law: Procedural Due Process on Doggie Death Row: U
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
 
2013] UNREVIEWABLE WARNING NOTICES AS PREDICATES 323 
restrictive manner.61 Minnesota’s dangerous dog laws, though, are 
not self-executing, meaning cities lack the authority to enforce the 
laws where the city has not adopted a procedure for the provision’s 
implementation.62 Therefore, many cities have their own dangerous 
dog ordinances, with varying procedures, to control dangerous 
dogs or animals.63 
III. THE SAWH DECISION 
A. Facts 
Mitchell Sawh, a Lino Lakes, Minnesota resident, owned a dog 
named Brody.64 In 2010, Brody injured three individuals—biting at 
least two of the three.65 After the third incident and a number of 
appeals to the City of Lino Lakes, the City ordered that Brody be 
euthanized.66 
1. The April 8th Incident 
On April 8, 2010, Sawh’s dog Brody either bit or scratched the 
left arm of a pedestrian near Sawh’s home.67 According to the City, 
Brody bit the pedestrian.68 The victim told an investigating officer 
 
 61.  Id. § 347.53; see, e.g., Hannan v. City of Minneapolis, 623 N.W.2d 281, 
284–85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that Minnesota Statutes chapter 347 does 
not preempt or conflict with a city ordinance regulating dangerous dogs). 
 62.  In re Molly, 712 N.W.2d 567, 570–71 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 63.  Procedures provided in city ordinances vary in amount of process given. 
Compare BROOKLYN PARK, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 92.25(B) (2013) (providing 
a “record review” by the chief of police when a potentially dangerous 
dog designation is appealed), with LAKEVILLE, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, 
§ 5-1-9(B)(1)(d) (2013) (providing a hearing consisting of the right to present 
evidence through witnesses and exhibits, cross-examine witnesses, and be heard in 
front of an impartial hearing officer). 
 64.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Minn. 2012). 
 65.  Id. While the Minnesota Supreme Court found Brody bit three people, 
Sawh argued that Brody playfully scratched the passerby in the first incident, and 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals found the record was unclear if Brody bit or 
scratched the passerby. Compare id. at 630, with Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief, supra 
note 2, at *8–10, and Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes (Sawh I), 800 N.W.2d 663, 665 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012). 
 66.  Abby Simons, Biting Dog to be Euthanized Today, Its Appeals Exhausted, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 21, 2012, at B3, available at 2012 WLNR 27689427. 
 67.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630. 
 68.  Appellant/Cross-Respondent City of Lino Lakes’ Brief and Addendum, 
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627 (No. A10-2143), 2012 WL 9974679, at *2 [hereinafter 
City’s Supreme Court Brief]. 
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that Brody came up to him “aggressively” and “ended up . . . biting 
his left arm causing the injury.”69 The officer observed a “fairly large 
series of bloody scratches” on the pedestrian’s arm that were 
“consistent with a dog’s teeth.”70 According to Sawh, Brody was 
walking and “happily wagging his tail,” and then he “simply jumped 
up on a pedestrian in a playful manner, and the pedestrian, 
unfortunately, was scratched.”71 
In response to the April 8 incident, the City designated Brody 
as “potentially dangerous” under section 503.15 of the Lino Lakes, 
Minnesota, Code of Ordinances (“City Code”).72 The City Code 
gave Sawh no right to appeal the potentially dangerous 
designation;73 however, the City placed no restrictions on Brody.74 
2. The October 15th Bite and Appeal 
On October 15, 2010, Brody undisputedly bit a second 
passerby.75 The City then designated Brody as “dangerous” under 
the City Code,76 informing Sawh he must remove Brody from the 
 
 69.  Respondent City of Lino Lakes’ Brief and Appendix at Appendix, 
Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663 (No. A10-2143) 2011 WL 3799463, app. at CA-6 
[hereinafter City’s Appeals Court Brief]. Only the PDF image of the City’s brief on 
Westlaw contains the appendix. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief, supra note 2, at *8–10. 
 72.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630. The relevant portions of the Lino Lakes City 
Code are reprinted in the appendix of the City of Lino Lakes’ brief to the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals. See City’s Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, 
app. at CA-31 to -35. The City Code’s statutory scheme allows an animal control 
officer to designate a dog as “‘potentially dangerous’ . . . upon receiving evidence 
that a[n] . . . animal has, when unprovoked, then bitten, attacked or threatened 
the safety of a person or a domestic animal as stated in division (3)(b) above.” 
LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(4) (2010), reprinted in City’s 
Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, app. at CA-32. Section 503.15(3)(b) defines a 
“potentially dangerous” animal as an animal that has: 
1. Bitten a human or domestic animal on public or private property; 
2. When unprovoked, chased or approached a person upon the 
streets, sidewalks, or any other public property in an apparent attitude 
of attack; or 
3. Has engaged in unprovoked attacks causing injury or otherwise 
threatening the safety of humans or domestic animals. 
 73.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630; Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 665 (“Neither the 
written notification nor the ordinance provided [Sawh] a meaningful opportunity 
to challenge the potentially dangerous animal declaration.”). 
 74.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.; see also LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5)(b), 
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city within fourteen days.77 The City Code allows an officer to 
designate an animal as “dangerous” where an animal has previously 
been declared “potentially dangerous” and then subsequently bites, 
attacks, or threatens the safety of a person or animal, pursuant to 
section 503.15(3)(a) of the City Code.78 The relevant clauses of 
section 503.15(3)(a) define a dangerous animal as one that has: 
“4. Bitten one or more persons on two or more occasions; or 
5. Been found to be potentially dangerous and/or the owner has 
personal knowledge of the same, the animal aggressively bites, 
attacks or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals.”79 
Sawh appealed the dangerous designation at a November 8, 
2010, hearing before the Lino Lakes City Council;80 however, the 
Council did not formally review the potentially dangerous 
designation.81 Sawh argued that both the Lino Lakes Police Chief 
and City Attorney made a presentation to the City Council that 
Brody was conclusively deemed “potentially dangerous,” and that 
the issue would not be revisited.82 
The City Council classified Brody as “dangerous” pursuant to 
section 503.15(3)(a)(5) because Brody had been designated 
“potentially dangerous” and then subsequently bit another 
person.83 The City required Sawh to comply with a series of 
restrictions, such as posting a dangerous dog sign, keeping Brody 
enclosed and muzzled at all times, and maintaining $300,000 in 
liability insurance.84 
 
quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635. 
 77.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630; see LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 503.15(7), reprinted in City’s Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, app. at CA-33. 
 78.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5), quoted in Sawh II, 
823 N.W.2d at 635. 
 79.  Id. § 503.15(3)(a), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 636. 
 80.  See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 630. 
 81.  Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 82.  Sawh’s Supreme Court Brief, supra note 2, at *12–13. 
 83.  Id.; see also Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 669 (“[W]e conclude that the city 
deemed [Sawh]’s dog ‘dangerous’ because the dog had already been declared 
‘potentially dangerous’ and subsequently bit a person.”). 
 84.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.16(1) (providing a list of 
restrictions the City may impose on an owner of a dog designated as “dangerous”), 
reprinted in City’s Appeals Court Brief, supra note 69, app. at CA-34. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss1/10
 
326 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
3. The November 9th Bite and Appeal 
On November 9, 2010, a day after the dangerous dog hearing, 
Brody bit a third person.85 The Police Chief impounded Brody, 
informing Sawh the incident was a “subsequent bite” under the City 
Code, which required the City to destroy Brody.86 Sawh appealed 
and was granted a hearing where the City Council found the biting 
was a “subsequent offense” under the City Code, which required 
the City to kill Brody.87 
B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision 
Sawh appealed the City Council’s decisions to the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals.88 Under the Roth threshold question, the appeals 
court found that a protected property interest had been implicated 
because dogs are considered private property.89 Balancing the three 
Mathews factors, the appeals court reversed the City Council’s 
decisions. The appeals court held that Sawh was denied sufficient 
procedural due process when the dangerous designation and the 
City Council’s order to euthanize Brody were predicated on the 
City’s potentially dangerous designation, which Sawh was not given 
a right to challenge.90 
The appeals court found that Sawh had “little interest in 
harboring animals that may be dangerous.”91 The court, however, 
agreed with Sawh under the second Mathews factor that there was a 
significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of property because 
Sawh was not provided with an opportunity to challenge the 
potentially dangerous designation, which acted as a predicate 
offense and not a mere warning notice.92 The court weighed the 
 
 85.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 631. 
 86.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.16(4) (providing that if an 
animal designated as “dangerous” is found to have committed a “subsequent 
offense” the animal control officer shall order the animal destroyed), quoted in 
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 636–37. 
 87.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 631. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d 
627 (Minn. 2012); see Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 633 (explaining the Roth standard). 
 90.  Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 670. 
 91.  Id. at 668 (quoting Am. Dog Owners Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 453 
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. Ct. App 1990)). 
 92.  Id. at 668–69. The appeals court agreed with Sawh that the potentially 
dangerous designation at the November 8 dangerous dog hearing was not up for 
debate because the Lino Lakes City Attorney and Chief of Police treated the 
13
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third Mathews factor in favor of Sawh because it found many 
municipalities around the state provide some sort of review after a 
city designates a dog “potentially dangerous.”93 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion 
The Minnesota Supreme Court also conducted the two-step 
analysis to determine if Sawh’s due process rights had been 
violated.94 Under the Roth threshold question, while the court 
recognized that dogs have long been considered personal 
property,95 the court ruled that Sawh had no right to challenge the 
potentially dangerous designation because “procedural due process 
protections do not apply when government action may lead to a 
deprivation . . . [of property] at some indeterminate point.”96 The 
court determined Sawh’s property was deprived when the City 
designated Brody as “dangerous” and ordered Brody’s 
destruction.97 
Balancing the three Mathews factors, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded the City’s procedures used to deprive Sawh of his 
property were constitutionally sufficient.98 Measuring Sawh’s private 
interest under the first Mathews factor, the court noted that while 
animal owners may have sentimental attachments to their pets, 
under Minnesota law a dog is measured by its “fair market value” 
and is treated like any other piece of tangible property.99 
Under the second Mathews factor, the court found that the 
City’s procedures used to designate Brody as “dangerous” and issue 
a destruction order did not create a risk of an erroneous 
 
potentially dangerous designation as conclusive. Id. at 669. 
 93.  Id. at 670 (referencing city ordinances from Golden Valley, Plymouth, 
Minneapolis, and St. Paul, Minnesota, which all provide a right to appeal or review 
of a potentially dangerous designation). 
 94.  See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (citing Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 
490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Carillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005)); 
supra Part II. 
 95.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 632 (citing Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 492, 
229 N.W. 869, 870 (1930)). 
 96.  Id. at 633 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 
(1972)). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 99.  Id. (citing Corn, 179 Minn. at 492, 229 N.W. at 870; Smith v. St. Paul City 
Ry. Co., 79 Minn. 254, 256, 82 N.W. 577, 578 (1900); Harrow v. St. Paul & Duluth 
R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890)). 
14
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deprivation of property.100 The court reasoned that because Sawh 
was able to present witnesses, explain his version of the events, and 
argue against the City’s findings at two separate hearings, the City’s 
procedures were “consistent with the requirements of due process,” 
even if weightier interests had been at stake.101 
Setting aside the question about whether Sawh’s property 
interest was implicated, the state supreme court’s conclusion 
differed with both Sawh’s argument and the court of appeals’ 
holding that the potentially dangerous designation functioned as a 
predicate.102 The Minnesota Supreme Court instead found that “the 
purpose of the ‘potentially dangerous’ designation is simply to put 
owners on notice of their animal’s dangerous tendencies.”103 The 
court supported its argument by construing section 503.15(5)(b) of 
the City Code as requiring the mere existence—not the correctness—
of a potentially dangerous designation, as well as written notice to 
the owner, for the City to declare an animal “dangerous,” after a 
subsequent bite or attack.104  
Under the third Mathews factor, the supreme court found “that 
the City ha[d] a compelling interest in insuring the health and 
safety of its citizens,”105 and had an interest in avoiding 
administrative and financial burdens with additional hearings.106 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was correct that, under Board of 
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, Sawh had no due process right to 
challenge the City’s potentially dangerous designation at the time 
the designation was issued because Sawh’s property could not be 
restricted or deprived.107 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 100.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 634–35. 
 101.  Id. at 634 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (approving of 
an informal hearing by a school to review a decision to discipline a student)). 
 102.  See id. at 634–35. 
 103.  Id. at 635. 
 104.  Id. at 634–35 (construing LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 503.15(4), (5)(b) (2010), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635–37). 
 105.  Id. at 635 (citing State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 570 (Minn. 2007)). 
 106.  Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)). 
 107.  Id. at 633; see Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–75 
(1972). While outside the scope of this note because the author agrees with the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s determination that the potentially dangerous 
designation alone does not implicate the Due Process Clause, some have argued 
that Roth set too high of a bar for what types of interests trigger a right to due 
process. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11:2, at 344 
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erred in its reasoning in several respects and failed to properly 
balance the interests involved when it applied the Mathews test. 
Section A.1 examines how the court under-weighed Sawh’s 
private interest in the life of his companion animal and explains 
why the court should abandon its treatment of companion animals 
as mere “tangible property” that is measured by the animal’s “fair 
market value.” Section A.2.a demonstrates how the court’s 
construction of the Lino Lakes dangerous dog ordinance, as only 
requiring the existence and not correctness of the potentially 
dangerous designation, leads to absurd and unreasonable results. 
Section A.2.b finds that the facts of Sawh are sufficiently analogous 
to a series of cases from the U.S., Minnesota, and Ohio Supreme 
Courts, which hold that an individual has a due process right to a 
hearing on an unreviewed designation or offense that is 
subsequently used as a predicate offense. Section A.3 discusses the 
government’s interest and the potential financial burdens to cities 
by providing additional process. Finally, section B proposes an 
alternative holding to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling. 
A. Sawh’s Right to Due Process Under the Mathews Test 
1. The Court Minimized Sawh’s Private Interest 
Under the first Mathews factor, the court minimized Sawh’s 
private property interest in his dog Brody. The Sawh court missed 
an opportunity to recognize our society’s overwhelming consensus 
that animals in general, and “companion animals”108 in particular, 
 
(2d ed. 1979) (arguing that where a person has an interest he reasonably believes 
to be vital to him, the person should not be administratively deprived of that 
interest without fair procedure); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in “The New 
Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 
445, 487–89 (1977) (arguing that the meaning of liberty in the Due Process Clause 
includes a freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures regardless if one’s 
property interest is implicated or not). 
 108.  See MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subdiv. 6 (2012) (defining pets and companion 
animals synonymously as including “any animal owned, possessed by, cared for, or 
controlled by a person for the present or future enjoyment of that person or 
another as a pet or companion”); Definition of Companion Animal, A.S.P.C.A., 
http://www.aspca.org/about-us/aspca-policy-and-position-statements/definition 
-of-companion-animal (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (defining companion animals as 
domesticated or domestic-bred animals “whose physical, emotional, behavioral 
and social needs can be readily met as companions in the home, or in a close daily 
relationship with humans”), cited in Sabrina DeFabritiis, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: 
Companion Animals, Emotional Damages and the Judiciary’s Failure to Keep Pace, 
16
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are something more than mere property and are often times 
considered members of the family.109 
Invoking century-old precedent on animal law, the court 
determined that Minnesota currently treats animals “like any other 
item of tangible personal property.”110 This determination, 
however, is outdated and incorrect. Minnesota, like almost all of 
the states111 and the federal government, affords extra protection to 
animals—especially companion animals—through animal anti-
cruelty laws.112 Second, animals are treated differently from 
property in other areas of the law, such as inheritance and tort 
law.113 Minnesota’s common-law notion that dog owners should 
only receive fair market value for their pets should be ignored as a 
legal anachronism. The notion stems from the fact that dogs were 
traditionally not considered property and were subsequently given 
the same method of valuation as farm animals, which do have an 
ascertainable market value.114 Finally, because courts employing the 
Mathews test are balancing interests and not awarding exact 
monetary values, like in torts cases, courts should recognize animal 
owners’ more ethereal interests in an animal’s companionship, 
 
32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 237 n.2 (2012). 
 109.  See AP Poll: Americans Consider Pets Family, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 24, 2009), 
http://www.nola.com/pets/index.ssf/2009/06/ap_poll_americans_consider_pet 
.html (“[H]alf of all American pet owners consider their pets as much a part of the 
family as any other person in the household; another 36 percent said their pet is 
part of the family but not a full member.”); Press Release, ASPCA, ASPCA 
Research Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Investigations to Expose 
Animal Abuse on Industrial Farms (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.aspca.org/about 
-us/press-releases/aspca-research-shows-americans-overwhelmingly-support-
investigations-expose (“[Seventy-one] percent of Americans support undercover 
investigative efforts by animal welfare organizations to expose animal abuse on 
industrial farms.”); see also DeFabritiis, supra note 108, at 242 n.36 (surveying polls 
that show Americans’ strong affinity to their pets). 
 110.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 633 (citing Corn v. Sheppard, 179 Minn. 490, 492, 
229 N.W. 869, 870 (1930) (holding a dog is personal property); Harrow v. St. Paul 
& Duluth R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890) (setting fair market 
value as the proper measure of damages for the death of a horse)). 
 111.  See Samantha D.E. Tucker, No Way to Treat Man’s Best Friends: The 
Uncounted Injuries of Animal Cruelty Victims, 19 ANIMAL L. 151, 157 (2012) 
(explaining as of 2012, forty-eight states have felony animal abuse provisions). 
 112.  See 7 U.S.C. 54 §§ 2131–2159 (2012); MINN. STAT. §§ 343.20–343.40 
(2012). 
 113.  See infra Part IV.A.1.b. 
 114.  FAVRE, supra note 54, at 36–38. 
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similar to how courts handle the ethereal interests in “new 
property.”115 
a. Minnesota’s Animal Anti-Cruelty Statute 
Minnesota broadly defines an animal as “every living creature 
except members of the human race.”116 Pet or “companion animal” 
is separately defined as “any animal owned, possessed by, cared for, 
or controlled by a person for the present or future enjoyment of 
that person or another as a pet or companion.”117 
Demonstrating an intent to protect companion animals from 
cruelty, in 2001 the Minnesota Legislature created harsher 
penalties for violating Minnesota’s animal anti-cruelty law when a 
pet or companion animal is harmed.118 The current animal anti-
cruelty statute makes it a misdemeanor where an individual, among 
other things, tortures, neglects, abandons, or acts cruelly toward 
any animal.119 It is a felony for an individual to mistreat a 
companion animal in certain ways that cause “great bodily harm” 
or death to the animal.120 Minnesota has banned animal fighting 
events since 1905,121 and since 1981 dogfighting or promoting any 
fighting between domestic animals has been a felony-level 
offense.122 
Like an owner of any property, the owners of companion 
animals have a certain “bundle of rights”: the right to possess, use, 
 
 115.  Compare Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (finding a continued 
possession of a license may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood), 
and Mertins v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 755 N.W.2d 329, 336–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008) (finding procedural due process protects state-issued licenses that are vital 
to the pursuit of a chosen livelihood or profession), with Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 
443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286–87 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (awarding a plaintiff $550 plus costs and 
disbursements for the loss of companionship and protection of a dog). 
 116.  MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subdiv. 2. 
 117.  Id. § 343.20, subdiv. 6. 
 118.  Corwin R. Kruse, Adding a Bit More Bite: Suggestions for Improving Animal-
Protection Laws in Minnesota, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1405, 1410 (2008) (citing 
Act of June 30, 2001, ch. 8, art. 8, §§ 5–13, 2001 Minn. Laws 1943, 2076–79 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 343.20–.21, .235)). 
 119.  MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subdiv. 1–7, 9(a). 
 120.  Id. § 343.21, subdiv. 9(d). The definitions for substantial and great bodily 
harm are nearly identical to the definitions in the criminal code concerning 
crimes against a person. Compare id. § 340.20, subdiv. 8–9 (animals), with id. 
§ 609.02, subdiv. 7a–8 (people). 
 121.  REVISED LAWS MINNESOTA 1905, at 1086 (Mark B. Dunnell ed. 1906). 
 122.  Act approved Apr. 8, 1981, ch. 22, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 31, 31–32 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.31). 
18
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exclude, and transfer title through a sale or gift.123 Similar to other 
forms of property, not all of these rights attach to companion 
animals.124 For example, an owner’s right to use a car and a pet in 
certain ways is restricted: there are speed limits and a pet owner is 
not allowed to torture or use his or her animal in an animal fight. 
However, there is a major distinction between “use restrictions” on 
companion animals and other tangible pieces of property, such as a 
car or house. Use restrictions on animals, as codified in 
Minnesota’s anti-cruelty laws, are for the welfare and benefit of the 
animal, and thus are more similar to child protection laws,125 while 
use restrictions on property such as cars, lawn mowers, or toxic 
chemicals are for the benefits of both the owner and the wider 
population. 
Animal anti-cruelty laws distinguish animals as property from 
other tangible property because the law stems from our 
understanding that both vertebrate non-human animals and 
humans have complex central nervous systems able to experience 
physical pain and suffering.126 As an early proponent for “animal 
rights,” English barrister Jeremy Bentham argued animals’ capacity 
for suffering is a vital characteristic that gives them, as living beings, 
the right to legal consideration.127 
 
 123.  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 83 (7th ed. 2010). 
 124.  Id. at 84. 
 125.  See David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal 
System, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1028–29 (2010) (explaining how early animal anti-
cruelty laws in the 1860s reflected a shift in the law because they put restrictions 
on animal owners out of concerns for the animals themselves). But see Kruse, supra 
note 118, at 1409 (explaining that to a great extent animal-protection efforts have 
still been about the protection of humans in that legislators link animal abuse with 
the health of the family). In fact, in 1905 the Minnesota Legislature empowered 
the Minnesota Society for the Prevention of Cruelty, the precursor for the 
Minnesota Humane Society, to enforce laws and prosecute those who are guilty of 
cruelty “to children and dumb animals.” Act approved Apr. 18, 1905, ch. 274, § 3, 
1905 Minn. Laws 409, 409 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. 
§ 343.01 (2012)). 
 126.  Favre notes that scientists studying pain in invertebrate animals found 
that invertebrates such as crabs and lobsters have only about 100,000 neurons 
compared to 100 billion in people and other vertebrates. FAVRE, supra note 54, 
at 17–18. 
 127.  David Favre & Vivian Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws During 
the 1800’s, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 310–11 n.1 (1781)) 
(“[T]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?”). 
For a discussion of the scientific foundation of recognizing animal pain and 
pleasure, see JONATHAN BALCOMBE, PLEASURABLE KINGDOM: ANIMALS AND THE 
19
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b. The Treatment of Animals in Other Areas of the Law 
Animals are treated differently from inanimate property in 
other areas of the law, such as inheritance and tort law. In 
inheritance law, a majority of states have pet trust laws either 
adopted from or modeled after the Uniform Probate Code or the 
Uniform Trust Code, allowing pet owners to provide for the care of 
their animal after the owner’s death.128 A number of state courts 
void clauses in wills on public policy grounds that demand the 
destruction of the testator’s animals.129 
In a lost and found property case, the Vermont Supreme 
Court refused to apply the state’s lost property statute to pets, 
which it interpreted to apply to farm animals but not companion 
animals.130 The court reasoned that pets’ worth, unlike agricultural 
animals, is not primarily financial, but emotional: “[The dog’s] 
value derives from the animal’s relationship with its human 
companions.”131 
In tort law, a minority of courts have approved damages for 
owners whose companion animals have been killed by a negligent 
act, even when the “actual value” or “intrinsic value” of the pet to 
its owner132 is beyond the fair market value of the animal.133 Courts 
 
NATURE OF FEELING GOOD (2006). 
 128.  See BRUCE A. WAGMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW 627–28 (4th ed. 2010) 
(surveying pet trust law). See generally Frances H. Foster, Should Pets Inherit?, 63 FLA. 
L. REV. 801 (2011) (discussing such topics as the ramifications and advisability of 
pet inheritance). 
 129.  See, e.g., In re Capers’ Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 141 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 
1963) (voiding a testatrix’s will clause to destroy her Irish Setters); see also In re 
Brand’s Estate, No. 28473 (Vt. Prob. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999) (finding testator’s will 
clause to destroy his horses void as against public policy), reprinted in WAGMAN ET 
AL., supra note 128, at 598. Professor Susan J. Hankin writes that the case of In re 
Brand’s Estate is “often cited because it so well exemplifies the difference between 
animals and inanimate property.” Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: 
Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314, 
353 (2007). Hankin explained when the provisions of the Brand will (giving the 
testator’s wishes for his car and horses both to be destroyed and killed) became 
known “there was very little concern expressed about crushing the car, but a great 
deal of public outcry about the fate of horses.” Id. 
 130.  See Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 632 (Vt. 1997). 
 131.  Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
 132.  “Actual” or “intrinsic” value refers to the value of property to the specific 
person who happens to own it, as opposed to the value the property would receive 
on the actual market. In re McCannel, 301 N.W.2d 910, 924, n.11 (Minn. 1980). 
The court in Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, defined “intrinsic value” as “an 
inherent value not established by market forces; it is a personal or sentimental 
value. For example, the intrinsic value of trees is said to be comprised of both an 
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“have adopted an ‘actual value’ approach when the market value 
for [a piece of property] (1) is nonexistent, (2) cannot be 
ascertained, or (3) is not a true measure of its worth.”134 Courts 
using the “actual value” approach will award an animal owner 
reasonable replacement costs, for example, “the cost of purchasing 
a puppy of the same breed, the cost of immunization, the cost of 
neutering the pet, and the cost of comparable training.”135 
While the Minnesota Court of Appeals has rejected the “actual 
value” approach to pet damages,136 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
awarded the “actual value” of a grove of ornamental trees to 
plaintiffs who brought a negligence claim.137 In C.S. McCrossan, the 
supreme court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the actual 
value of the trees, beyond their market value, because the trees had 
“substantial value for shade and ornamental purposes” to the 
landowners, which no market could reflect.138 The C.S. McCrossan 
case provides an analogy to the valuation of companion animals: 
like the trees’ “intrinsic value” to the landowners for their shade 
and ornamental purpose, any court in the future measuring a pet 
owner’s interest could find a pet has a substantial “intrinsic value” 
to its owner for its companionship purposes.139 The supreme court 
in Sawh missed this opportunity. 
Today, Alaska,140 California,141 Florida,142 Hawaii,143 Idaho,144 and 
Kentucky145 allow pain and suffering or “loss of companionship” 
 
ornamental (aesthetic) value and a utility (shade) value.” 144 S.W.3d 554, 563–64 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). 
 133.  See Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 314 (Alaska 2001); Jankoski v. 
Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Brousseau 
v. Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Civ. Ct. 1980); Shera v. N.C. State Univ. 
Veterinary Teaching Hosp., 723 S.E.2d 352, 357–58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); 
McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 40, 42 (Ct. Cl. 
1994). 
 134.  Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 192 n.57 (Tex. 2013). 
 135.  Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 314. 
 136.  Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
Harrow v. St. Paul & Duluth R.R., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890)), 
abrogated on other grounds by Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 137.  See Rector, Wardens & Vestry of St. Christopher’s Episcopal Church v. 
C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 306 Minn. 143, 144–45, 235 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975). 
 138.  Id. at 144, 235 N.W.2d at 610. 
 139.  Id. Contra Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 190. The Texas Supreme Court 
rejected this analogy by noting a similar Texas case about the “intrinsic value” of 
the “ornamental” or “aesthetic” trees was not rooted in the owner’s “subjective 
emotions.” Id. 
 140.  Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 
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damages beyond the fair market value of an animal to be recovered 
when a pet has been killed by a tortious act.146 States that do not 
allow for non-economic emotional damages in animal torts cases 
mostly base their reasoning on a public policy rationale that the 
“flood gates” will open and a deluge of civil pet litigation will 
result.147 While the majority of states refuse to award emotional 
distress or “loss of companionship” damages to pet owners whose 
animals have been negligently or intentionally killed,148 many courts 
will preface their holdings with strong language indicating their 
discomfort in labeling pets as mere property with a financial 
value.149 
A valid criticism of considering Sawh’s “loss of companionship” 
in Brody, or Brody’s “intrinsic value” to Sawh, as part of Sawh’s 
 
1985) (“We recognize that the loss of a beloved pet can be especially distressing in 
egregious situations.”). 
 141.  Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 599–600 (Ct. App. 2012), 
review denied, No. S205836, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 11667 (Dec. 12, 2012) (holding 
California law allows a pet owner to recover for mental suffering caused by 
another’s intentional act that injures or kills his or her animal). 
 142.  La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964) 
(“[W]e feel that the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and that 
the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the 
owner should recover. . . .”). 
 143.  Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 
1981) (allowing for “recovery for mental distress suffered as the result of the 
negligent destruction of property”). 
 144.  Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). 
 145.  Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). 
 146.  Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to 
Treatment of Pets and Animals, 91 A.L.R.5TH 545 (2001). 
 147.  See Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 194 (Tex. 2013) (quoting pet 
welfare agencies’ concern that “‘pet litigation will become a cottage industry,’ 
exposing veterinarians, shelter and kennel workers, animal-rescue workers, even 
dog sitters, to increased liability”); Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 799 
(Wis. 2001) (“Were we to recognize a claim for damages for the negligent loss of a 
dog, we can find little basis for rationally distinguishing other categories of animal 
companion.”). 
 148.  See Strickland, 397 S.W.3d at 191 n.49 (providing a state survey of courts’ 
recognition of pet “loss of companionship” damages). 
 149.  See, e.g., Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 
(Civ. Ct. 1979) (finding plaintiff is entitled to damages beyond the market value of 
the dog because “a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere 
in between a person and a piece of personal property”); Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d 
at 798 (“Labeling a dog ‘property’ fails to describe the value human beings place 
upon the companionship that they enjoy with a dog. A companion dog is not a 
fungible item, equivalent to other forms of property.”). Despite these cases’ strong 
language, Hankin notes they have little precedential value. Hankin, supra note 
129, at 343–47. 
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private interest in the Mathews test is that it would require a judge 
to insert his or her subjective viewpoint into the test.150 However, as 
Professor Pierce notes, judges often insert their subjective view 
while balancing the private interests in the Mathews test by assessing 
the relative value of such things as “welfare benefits, . . . a 
government job, a person’s reputation, access to government 
provided educational benefits, freedom from corporal punishment, 
and hundreds of other objectively incomparable interests that 
qualify as life, liberty, or property.”151 
Second, Pierce notes that a judge’s subjective view in balancing 
the Mathews factors only creates “modest differences in the 
required procedural safeguards,” which are flexible.152 This is far 
preferable, Pierce argues, to the right/privilege distinction where a 
judge’s subjective view was sub rosa and was dispositive on whether a 
hearing was granted or denied.153 Furthermore, Pierce argues 
“[o]bjective [judicial] valuation of protected interests is both 
impossible and inappropriate”: “If the judiciary does not insert its 
subjective values, some other government institution must.”154 
Outside tort law, measuring Brody’s value as Brody’s “actual 
value” to Sawh, or as Sawh’s loss of companionship, is more 
appropriate in light of the Mathews test, which balances subjective 
interests rather than exact monetary values in determining 
damages.155 For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court 
did not weigh the Goldbergs’ welfare benefits in monetary terms, 
which would have been ascertainable.156 Rather, the Court weighed 
the Goldbergs’ interest in receiving public assistance in terms of 
the “intrinsic value” to them as a family: a “means to obtain 
essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.”157 
 
 150.  PIERCE ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.3.4d, at 275. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 276. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[R]esolution of the issue 
whether the . . . procedures . . . are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of 
the governmental and private interests that are affected.”) (emphasis added); 
cf. Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 192–93 (Tex. 2013) (making a distinction 
between a dog’s “value” measured by the market, which the court held should be 
used in tort damages cases, and the relational and emotional worth of a dog). 
 156.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970). 
 157.  Id. at 264. 
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Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court,158 the Washington State 
Court of Appeals,159 and a California appeals court,160 have all 
weighed the private interest of a pet owner in the Mathews test 
beyond the pet’s fair market value. 
c. Departing from the “Fair Market” Valuation of Companion 
Animals 
The Sawh court cited century-old animal law precedent 
holding that dogs, like domestic farm animals, should be measured 
by their fair market value.161 Measuring companion animals by their 
fair market value, though, stems from a legal anachronism where 
dogs traditionally had a “special status” under the law and were not 
treated as full property.162 Animals traditionally were separated into 
two categories: unowned wild animals (feræ naturæ), which, “until 
killed or subdued, there is no property,”163 and domestic animals 
(ferae domitæ), in which the right of property is “perfect and 
complete.”164 Because the crime of larceny was punishable by death 
in some periods of English history, courts limited the scope of what 
was considered property.165 In limiting the scope of property before 
the twentieth century, courts held that dogs were not domestic 
animals, and thus were not property.166 
 
 158.  Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991, 996 (Alaska 2008) (“While 
pets are considered property under the law of Alaska, we agree with the parties 
that the emotional bond people feel toward their pets elevates this interest above 
most property.”) (footnote omitted). 
 159.  Mansour v. King County, 128 P.3d 1241, 1246 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“[T]he bond between [the] pet and [the] owner often runs deep and . . . many 
people consider pets part of the family.”); Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground, 
63 P.3d 142, 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (finding an interest in a pet is greater than 
mere economic interest because pets are not fungible). 
 160.  Phillips v. San Luis Obispo Cnty. Dept. of Animal Regulation, 183 Cal. 
App. 3d 372, 377 (1986) (“[I]t is equally true [that] there are no other domestic 
animals to which the owner or his family can become more strongly attached, or 
the loss of which will be more keenly felt.” (quoting Johnson v. McConnell, 
22 P. 219, 200 (Cal. 1889))). 
 161.  See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 2012) (citing Harrow v. St. Paul 
& Duluth R.R. Co., 43 Minn. 71, 72, 44 N.W. 881, 881 (1890); Smith v. St. Paul City 
Ry. Co., 79 Minn. 254, 82 N.W. 577 (1900)). 
 162.  FAVRE, supra note 54, at 36–38. 
 163.  See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“It is 
admitted that a fox is an animal feræ naturæ, and that property in such animals is 
acquired by occupancy only.”). 
 164.  See Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897). 
 165.  FAVRE, supra note 54, at 37. 
 166.  Id.; see United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292, 295 (1856) (finding the 
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Beginning in the 1930s courts began to eliminate the special 
status of dogs as “imperfect or qualified” property and put dogs in 
the same category as domesticated farm animals, whose value was 
measured by the market.167 Companion animals, though, are unlike 
domestic animals, such as horses, pigs, or cows, because they have 
no ascertainable economic value measured by what their owner 
could receive for them on the existing market.168 While the fair 
market value for farm animals, such as cattle, is a viable method of 
valuation because a cattle rancher owns cattle for economic 
reasons, pets are owned for their companionship, and therefore 
their value is unconnected to any market force.169 If Sawh’s interest 
in Brody was economic, Sawh would have just replaced Brody with 
another dog rather than spend tens of thousands of dollars on 
appeals and Brody’s boarding costs at the pound.170 
The Sawh court, therefore, should have ignored this 
antiquated precedent, which has no basis in today’s realities, of 
valuing companion animals under their fair market value. This is 
especially true in the Mathews balancing test, which weighs interests, 
not mere economic value. 
2. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation 
Under the second Mathews factor, disallowing Sawh to be 
heard on the potentially dangerous designation significantly 
increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property because, 
despite the court’s finding, the designation was used as a predicate 
element of the dangerous designation, and ultimately led to the 
City euthanizing Brody. First, the court erred in determining the 
potentially dangerous designation was merely a warning notice, and 
misconstrued the City Code as only requiring the existence and not 
the correctness of the potentially dangerous designation. Second, 
the court’s ruling that the dangerous designation only required the 
 
killing of a dog is not an indictable offense because animals with no value, such as 
dogs, are not in the meaning of “beasts” in the statute, which includes animals that 
have an “intrinsic value,” such as horses, oxen and cows). 
 167.  FAVRE, supra note 54, at 36–37. 
 168.  Id. at 36. 
 169.  See DeFabritiis, supra note 108, at 239–44 (noting that by the end of the 
twentieth century the role of pets had evolved from service to pure 
companionship). Many animal owners treat their pets as children—they purchase 
pet holiday gifts, travel with their pets, schedule play dates with their dogs, and 
provide their pets with health insurance and day-care. Id. at 241–42. 
 170.  See Simons, supra note 66. 
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existence of the potentially dangerous designation conflicts with 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court’s own precedent, and a 
similar case from the Ohio Supreme Court. Third, the value of 
giving additional process is high because the dispute of whether 
Brody bit or playfully scratched the first person involves 
“adjudicative” facts, which are best dealt with at a hearing where 
the parties are present. Finally, because the City could determine 
the validity of a potentially dangerous designation at the same 
hearing on the dangerous dog designation, the court failed to 
recognize that the financial and administrative burdens to the City 
would be low. 
a. “Potentially Dangerous”: A Simple Warning, Predicate 
Offense, or Both? 
One crucial issue in Sawh was whether the potentially 
dangerous designation functioned as a warning notice or a 
predicate offense under the plain language of the City Code.171 
The mere issuance of a warning from a city to put owners on notice 
of their animal’s dangerous tendencies would not trigger the Due 
Process Clause because no property interest has been restricted.172 
However, a predicate offense that provides a basis on which a city 
later deems a dog “dangerous” may trigger the Due Process Clause 
where the predicate is an element used to deprive property.173 
The City Code is subject to the same rules of statutory 
construction as the Minnesota Statutes.174 When interpreting a 
statute, courts “first look to see whether the statute’s language, on 
its face, is clear or ambiguous.”175 “An unambiguous statute must be 
construed according to its plain language.”176 Only if the statute is 
ambiguous will courts look outside the statutory text to ascertain 
legislative intent.177 In ascertaining legislative intent, courts 
presume the legislature did “not intend a result that is absurd, 
 
 171.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Minn. 2012). 
 172.  See id. at 632, 635. 
 173.  See Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 668–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 
823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012). 
 174.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 101.02(1) (2013). 
 175.  Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000); 
see MINN. STAT. §§ 645.16–.17 (2012). 
 176.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16; Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 556 (Minn. 2012) 
(citing State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. 2002). 
 177.  MINN. STAT. § 645.16; Erdman v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 788 N.W.2d 50, 
56 (Minn. 2010) (citing Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 425). 
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impossible of execution, or unreasonable,”178 or intend to violate 
the Minnesota or United States Constitution.179 
Section 503.15(5) of the City Code provided that an animal 
control officer shall have the authority to designate an animal as a 
dangerous animal upon receiving evidence of the following: 
(a)The animal has, when unprovoked, bitten, attacked or 
threatened the safety of a person or domestic animal as 
stated in division (3)(a) above; or 
(b)The animal has been declared potentially dangerous and the 
animal has then bitten, attached [sic] or threatened the 
safety of a person or domestic animal as stated in division 
(3)(a) above.180 
The court of appeals concluded that “the city deemed [Sawh’s] dog 
‘dangerous’ because the dog had already been declared ‘potentially 
dangerous’ and subsequently bit a person” under the meaning of 
section 503.15(5)(b).181 The Minnesota Supreme Court did not 
disturb this conclusion. In construing section 503.15(5)(b) the 
supreme court found: 
To uphold the designation of an animal as “dangerous,” 
the City must find only that an animal control officer has 
previously declared an animal “potentially dangerous” and 
provided written notice of that fact to the owner, not that 
the “potentially dangerous” designation was correct. . . . In 
other words, the purpose of the “potentially dangerous” 
designation is simply to put owners on notice of their 
animal’s dangerous tendencies. . . . Accordingly, because 
the City Code requires only the existence of a “potentially 
dangerous” designation to declare an animal “dangerous,” 
the City was not required to provide Sawh with an 
opportunity to challenge the correctness of that designation 
at a later hearing.182 
The City Code is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.183 On the one hand, the 
 
 178.  MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1); Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 278 (“[C]ourts should 
construe a statute to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.”). 
 179.  MINN. STAT. § 645.17(3). 
 180.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5) (2010) (emphasis 
added), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Minn. 2012). 
 181.  Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d 
627 (Minn. 2012). 
 182.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 634–35 (citations omitted). 
 183.  Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 278 (quoting Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 
598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)). 
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Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the potentially dangerous 
designation was more than a mere warning because the designation 
could act as a predicate on which the City later could deem the dog 
“dangerous” under section 503.15(3)(a).184 This section defines a 
“dangerous animal,” among other things, as an animal that has 
(1) “been found to be potentially dangerous and . . . [(2)] aggressively 
bites, attacks or endangers the safety of humans or domestic 
animals.”185 On the other hand, the supreme court’s interpretation 
that the potentially dangerous designation acts only as a warning is 
also reasonable because section 503.15(4), which defines when an 
animal control officer may designate a dog as “potentially 
dangerous,” provides that an officer shall cause the owner of the 
potentially dangerous animal to be notified in writing.186 The City 
also could not place any restrictions on a dog designated as 
“potentially dangerous.”187 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction of the 
ambiguous section of the Lino Lake’s City Code is erroneous 
because its interpretation leads to absurd and unreasonable 
results.188 Under the court’s construction, for example, a city could 
lawfully pass an ordinance providing that a driver will be given two 
speeding “warning notices” where no fine or penalty is imposed 
and on the third speeding incident the driver will suffer a 
mandatory one-year license revocation. Allowing the underlying 
facts behind the prior warnings to be unreviewable at a subsequent 
hearing, as the supreme court did in Sawh, creates a substantial risk 
of an erroneous property deprivation because an officer working 
for the city may have made an innocent mistake, or may have been 
acting arbitrarily. Under the supreme court’s ruling in Sawh, 
 
 184.  Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d at 668. 
 185.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(3)(a)(5) (emphasis 
added), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 636. Although the court of appeals cited 
the definitional section of the ordinance, the section construed by the supreme 
court was section 503.15(5)(b), which permits an animal control officer the 
authority to designate a dog as “dangerous” based on two elements: (1) a dog is 
found to be “potentially dangerous,” and (2) the same animal is involved in a 
subsequent bite or attack. Id. § 503.15(5)(b), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635. 
 186.  Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635 (citing LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 503.15(4)). 
 187.  Id. at 633. 
 188.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2012) (providing that in interpreting 
statutes courts should presume “the legislature does not intend a result that is 
absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”). 
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though, the city would be free to issue arbitrary warnings because 
the Due Process Clause was not triggered. 
The above scenario is antithetical to the “fair play” essence of 
the Due Process Clause,189 which seeks to protect the individual 
against arbitrary government action190 and to provide procedural 
safeguards to illuminate underlying facts to prevent erroneous 
decisions from innocent error.191 
A better construction of the ordinance is one that recognizes 
that the potentially dangerous designation in the City Code 
functions both as a warning and as a predicate at various stages of 
the procedures provided in the City Code regulating dogs. 
The potentially dangerous designation originally functions as a 
warning notice when first issued, thus not triggering a hearing. 
This effectuates the original intent of dangerous dog laws in 
preventing and not merely reacting to dangerous animals.192 When 
the potentially dangerous designation subsequently is an element 
of the dangerous dog designation, then a better construction of the 
ordinance is that the potentially dangerous designation acts as a 
predicate offense. Given that the purpose of statutory construction 
is to “[s]ave and not to destroy” a legislative act,193 this 
interpretation saves the ordinance from absurd, unreasonable, and 
unconstitutional results.194 
b. The Court’s Construction of the City Code Contradicts 
Precedent on Due Process and Predicate Offenses 
At oral arguments, Justice Stras of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court asked the counsel for both the City and Sawh why the U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Bell v. Burson195 should not give Sawh a right 
to a hearing on the potentially dangerous designation.196 Justice 
 
 189.  Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). 
 190.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)). 
 191.  Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963), quoted in Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591–92 (1972) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 192.  See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (discussing the probable 
legislative intent of the dangerous dog laws). 
 193.  E.g., Kaufman v. Swift Cnty., 225 Minn. 169, 173, 30 N.W.2d 34, 37 
(1947). 
 194.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2012). 
 195.  402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
 196.  Oral Argument at 29:30, 56:25, Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012) 
(No. A10-2143), available at http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo 
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Stras was not given a complete answer of why the facts of Sawh are 
analogous to or distinguishable from Bell to demand a similar or 
different result—at no fault of either counsel since the case was 
never discussed in their briefs. To answer Justice Stras’s question, 
Bell, along with other similar cases concerning due process and 
predicate offenses, would guarantee Sawh a hearing on the 
potentially dangerous designation at the subsequent dangerous 
dog hearing. 
In Bell, after an uninsured driver was involved in a car 
accident, Georgia law required the driver to either post a bond or 
security cash deposit of the amount of damages the injured party 
claimed in a pending civil suit, or the Georgia Department of 
Public Safety would revoke his license.197 The driver requested an 
administrative hearing where he asserted he was not liable for the 
accident; however, the Georgia Department of Public Safety would 
only review (1) if the driver was involved in the accident (i.e., the 
mere existence of the accident), and (2) if the driver had posted 
the cash bond (i.e., whether the driver failed to comply with the 
subsequent condition resulting in the driver’s license revocation).198 
The Court in Bell held that because the possibility of liability 
acted as a predicate for the license revocation, when the driver did 
not pay the cash bond, the driver had a right to be heard on 
whether there was a reasonable possibility he was liable for the 
amounts claimed.199 The driver, therefore, had a right to judicial 
review of the probable correctness of his liability—not merely the 
existence of his possible liability. 
Similarly, the Court in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez200 found 
that immigrant defendants had the due process right to challenge 
the lawfulness and not the mere existence of their prior 
deportations, which were used as an element of a felony offense of 
illegally reentering the United States after deportation.201 The 
defendants argued the prior deportations were unlawful because 
they were not informed of their right to counsel and therefore the 
deportations could not be used as predicate offenses.202 While the 
 
_NEW.php?number=A102143. 
 197.  Bell, 402 U.S. at 537. 
 198.  Id. at 537–38. 
 199.  Id. at 541–42. 
 200.  481 U.S. 828 (1987). 
 201.  Id. at 837–40. 
 202.  Id. at 831–32. 
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Court found no congressional intent to sanction challenges of the 
lawfulness of the deportation,203 the Court also found that to 
impose criminal sanctions predicated on any deportation, 
regardless of how violative of the rights of an alien the hearing may 
have been, does not comport with procedural due process.204 
The Court found: 
Our cases establish that where a determination made in 
an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in 
the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there 
must be some meaningful review of the administrative 
proceeding. . . . This principle means at the very least . . . 
an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be 
made available before the administrative order may be 
used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal 
offense.205 
In State v. Cowan, a county dog warden in Ohio declared 
Cowan’s dog as “vicious” under a county ordinance, placing 
restrictions on the dog.206 Cowan later failed to abide by the vicious 
dog restrictions and was charged with various misdemeanor 
charges, where the vicious dog designation was used as a predicate 
offense.207 The Ohio Supreme Court held that using an 
unreviewable vicious dog designation by an animal control officer 
as an element of a crime violates procedural due process.208 The 
court found the law unconstitutional on its face because the vicious 
dog designation restricted the defendant’s property without a right 
to a hearing.209 Finally, the court found the law unconstitutional as 
applied because the vicious dog designation was used as an 
unreviewable and conclusive element of the charged crime.210 
 
 203.  Id. at 833–37. 
 204.  Id. at 837. Therefore, even if the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct 
that the ordinance only required the existence of the potentially dangerous 
designation, under Mendoza-Lopez, the court must determine whether declaring a 
dog “dangerous” based on any potentially dangerous designation—no matter how 
arbitrary or erroneous the original designation was—comports with the 
constitutional requirement of due process. Id. at 837–38. 
 205.  Id. at 837–38 (citations omitted). 
 206.  814 N.E.2d 846, 847 (Ohio 2004). 
 207.  Id. at 848. 
 208.  Id. at 850. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. Similar to how the Lino Lakes City Attorney and Chief of Police told 
the City Council the potentially dangerous designation was conclusive, see Sawh I, 
800 N.W.2d 663, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), the Cowan court disapproved of the 
state repeatedly telling the jury that the warden had determined that the dogs 
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In State v. Wiltgen, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 
judicially unreviewed license revocation from a prior driving while 
intoxicated (DWI) offense cannot be used as a predicate to 
enhance a future DWI charge when the defendant has not waived 
review of the license revocation.211 Wiltgen was charged with a third-
degree DWI and her license was automatically revoked.212 While 
Wiltgen requested judicial review on her license revocation, she was 
arrested for another DWI and was charged with an enhanced 
second-degree DWI based on two aggravating factors, one of which 
was the unreviewed license revocation.213 Employing the Mathews 
test, and relying on Mendoza-Lopez, the court held that Wiltgen’s 
procedural due process rights were violated because her liberty 
interest was high, and using the existence of a stayed license 
revocation as a “conclusive element of a crime . . . greatly increases 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation.”214 
The chart below provides a quick comparison of the four 
previously mentioned cases to the facts in Sawh:  
 
were “vicious” and it was not the jury’s job to decide whether it was fair for the dog 
warden to make the determination. See Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850. 
 211.  737 N.W.2d 561, 569–70 (Minn. 2007). Under Minnesota DWI law when 
an individual refuses a test to determine blood alcohol level, the individual can be 
charged with a crime, such as a higher-level third-degree DWI offense, and the 
individual’s license is automatically revoked. MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2, 
169A.26, subdiv. 1(b), 169A.52, subdiv. 1, 3 (2012). However, the individual may 
request judicial review on the license revocation. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2. 
 212.  Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 565. 
 213.  Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 169A.25, subdiv. 1(a) (providing that a person who 
is driving while impaired where two aggravating factors are present is guilty of DWI 
in the second degree). An “aggravating factor” means a “qualified prior impaired 
driving incident,” which includes “prior impaired driving-related losses of license.” 
Id. § 169A.03, subdiv. 3. 
 214.  Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 569. 
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At first glance, the supreme court’s decision in Sawh seems 
distinguishable from the above cases because the first adverse 
decision against Sawh, unlike the four other cases, could not alone 
result in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.220 However, this is 
not important because the other courts were not examining 
whether the parties deserved a hearing at the time of the first 
adverse decision, but rather if the parties had a right to a hearing 
about the correctness of the first adverse decision when it was later 
used as an element or predicate of the second offense.221 
 
 215.  402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
 216.  481 U.S. 828 (1987). 
 217.  814 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2004). 
 218.  737 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. 2007). 
 219.  823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012). 
 220.  See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 633 (observing that the government is to 
provide sufficient process “only when the government has the ability to deprive an 
individual of a protected interest” (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). 
 221.  Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 834 (“The issue before us is whether a federal 
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The Cowan court found regardless of whether the defendant was 
afforded a hearing on the vicious dog determination, the law was 
unconstitutional as applied because the vicious dog element of the 
crime was removed from the jury’s consideration (i.e., its existence 
was conclusive).222 The court said that due process guarantees a 
person the right of “controverting, by proof, every material fact 
which bears on the question of right in the matter involved. If any 
question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against him, 
such is not due process of law.”223 
The five cases share two interrelated propositions. First, in 
cases where an adverse decision or designation is used as a 
predicate offense or element of a subsequent offense, the original 
adverse decision or designation plays a crucial role in a statutory 
scheme where its absence will release or reduce the individual of 
criminal or civil consequences.224 For example, in Cowan, without a 
vicious dog designation, the misdemeanor charges are dismissed.225 
In Wiltgen, if a judge finds in favor of the defendant at the 
revocation hearing, the prosecutor cannot use the revocation as a 
predicate to enhance the DWI charge.226 
Second, because the existence of the prior offense or 
designation is needed to support a second subsequent offense, 
which can deprive someone of their liberty or property, a person 
has a due process right to have a hearing on the correctness or 
lawfulness of the prior adjudication or designation, before it is used 
as a conclusive element.227 To allow the unreviewed predicate 
offense to be a conclusive element would risk an erroneous 
 
court must always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order . . . .”); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (finding the original question of full 
liability would be adjudicated in a civil case between the parties involved); Wiltgen, 
737 N.W.2d at 566 (finding the issue in the case was whether using an unreviewed 
license revocation as an aggravating factor in a subsequent DWI charge violated 
due process); cf. Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850 (holding that the appellee had a right 
to a hearing on the original vicious dog designation, but also that the vicious dog 
designation cannot be used as a conclusive element of a subsequent criminal 
offense). 
 222.  Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850. 
 223.  Id. (quoting Williams v. Dollison, 405 N.E.2d 714, 716 (Ohio 1980)). 
 224.  See Bell, 402 U.S. at 541. 
 225.  See Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 847–48. 
 226.  See Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 565 (explaining how a license revocation can 
lead to a higher-level DWI charge). 
 227.  See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987); 
Bell, 402 U.S. at 542; Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 570; Cowan, 814 N.E.2d at 850. 
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property.228 For example, the Court in 
Bell found that a hearing should determine if there is a “reasonable 
possibility of a judgment being rendered” against the petitioner so 
the required cash bond, loss, or license would not be taken 
erroneously because of an unfounded civil claim.229 
The Bell, Mendoza-Lopez, Cowan, and Wiltgen court decisions 
create the rule that where an adverse decision or designation by the 
government could potentially deprive an individual of life, liberty, 
or property in the future based on the action or inaction of an 
individual, and that original designation is used as a predicate or 
element of a subsequent offense, then the defendant has a 
procedural due process right to a fair hearing to review the 
correctness of the original offense. 
The facts and the scheme of the ordinance in Sawh are 
sufficiently analogous to these cases to demand a similar result of 
the right to a hearing of the potentially dangerous designation in 
order to mitigate the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property. 
The potentially dangerous designation is not merely a warning but 
plays a crucial role in the scheme of the ordinance because it can 
be used as one of two elements to declare a dog “dangerous.”230 
If the potentially dangerous designation is found to be issued in 
error then the dangerous dog designation should fail.231 
In addition, allowing the potentially dangerous designation to 
be used as a conclusive element in the dangerous dog designation 
creates a substantial risk that Sawh’s property could erroneously be 
restricted or deprived.232 Even if Brody bit a person at the second 
incident, without a review of why Brody was designated as 
“potentially dangerous,” an animal control officer’s innocent 
mistake or arbitrary, capricious, or irrational decision would 
remain uncorrected. 
 
 228.  Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 569. 
 229.  Bell, 402 U.S. at 540. 
 230.  LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(3)(a), (5)(b) (2010) 
(providing that an animal can be found “dangerous” if it 1) has been declared to 
be “potentially dangerous” and 2) subsequently bit, attacked, or threatened the 
safety of someone), quoted in Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635–36 (Minn. 2012). 
 231.  Lino Lakes will not have this problem anymore because it has 
subsequently revised its City Code to no longer have a potentially dangerous 
designation. See LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.01 (2013). 
 232.  See Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 570 (“[T]he opportunity for erroneous 
deprivation is more significant where judicial review has not been provided . . . .”). 
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c. Probable Value of Additional Procedures 
In determining the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
property, the Mathews test also asks courts to weigh the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.233 
Because this note disagrees with the Minnesota Supreme Court that 
the City Code only requires the existence of the potentially 
dangerous designation, additional procedures to determine the 
correctness of the designation would have value, especially since 
the designation can form one of the two elements to deprive or 
restrict an individual of his or her property.234 
Additional procedures are not always valuable. Professor Davis 
writes that the valuableness of the additional procedures and 
safeguards is dependent on whether the facts of the case are 
“adjudicative” or “legislative” in nature.235 “Adjudicative facts usually 
answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with 
what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of 
facts that go to a jury in a jury case.”236 “Legislative facts do not 
usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts 
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and 
discretion,” so additional trial-like procedures are not always 
useful.237 
The question of whether Brody bit or scratched the first 
individual and whether the animal control officer was correct in 
designating Brody as “potentially dangerous” involve classic 
adjudicative facts because the parties are “particularly well-situated 
to assist the trier-of-facts in resolving the issue.”238 Therefore, an 
additional hearing would be valuable to prevent the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of property because the parties—the Sawhs, 
the pedestrian, and the animal control officer—were all at the 
incident and are well suited to help the trier of fact to determine 
the correctness of the potentially dangerous designation. 
 
 233.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 234.  See LINO LAKES, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 503.15(5)(b), quoted in 
Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d at 635. 
 235.  PIERCE ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.3.4b, at 271. 
 236.  Id. (citing 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.2 (4th ed. 2002)). 
 237.  Id. For example, the question in Brown v. Board of Education of whether 
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal concern legislative facts. 
Id. at 272. 
 238.  Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined there was a factual 
dispute about whether Brody bit or scratched the first passerby. Sawh I, 
800 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d, 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 2012). 
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3. The Government Interest, Including Administrative Burdens 
Under the third Mathews factor, courts consider the 
government’s interest, which includes “the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.”239 The supreme court was correct to determine the 
government has a compelling interest in ensuring the health and 
safety of its citizens, and this includes the regulation of dangerous 
dogs.240 However, if Sawh was given a right to challenge only the 
potentially dangerous designation when it was used as a predicate 
for the dangerous designation, then the supreme court failed to 
recognize that the administrative and financial burdens to the city 
in providing a brief hearing would be minimal.241 Many of the same 
parties and witnesses to the incident leading to the potentially 
dangerous designation, as well as the same city officials, would all 
be present at the dangerous dog hearing.242 Although the City 
Council did not formally review the potentially dangerous 
designation, the parties did present facts about the incident, 
demonstrating that any additional time spent on considering the 
potentially dangerous designation would not be burdensome.243 
Second, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted, many other 
municipalities provide some sort of review after the city designates 
a dog “potentially dangerous.”244 A review of the twenty most 
populous cities in Minnesota245 reveals that of the eighteen cities 
that adopted the Minnesota Legislature’s dangerous dog statute, 
only four—Burnsville,246 Eden Prairie, Minnetonka, and 
 
 239.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 240.  See Sawh II, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 2012). 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  See id. at 630–31 (discussing how the animal control officer, the Sawhs, 
and the police chief were present at the dangerous dog hearing). 
 243.  Id. at 631. 
 244.  Sawh I, 800 N.W.2d 663, 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 245.  Apple Valley, Blaine, Bloomington, Brooklyn Park, Burnsville, Coon 
Rapids, Duluth, Eagan, Eden Prairie, Edina, Lakeville, Maple Grove, Minneapolis, 
Minnetonka, Plymouth, Rochester, St. Cloud, St. Louis Park, St. Paul, and 
Woodbury as of the 2010 Census and 2012 population estimates. Annual 
Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (May 2013), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2012/SUB 
-EST2012-3.html (follow “Minnesota” hyperlink; then follow “Modify Table” 
hyperlink under “Actions”; then follow sort descending hyperlinks under “Census” 
or “2012”). 
 246.  BURNSVILLE, MINN., CITY CODE § 6-2-17 (2013). Burnsville’s ordinance is 
facially unconstitutional because it provides numerous restrictions on dogs 
designated “potentially dangerous” but provides the owners no right to review. Id. 
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Rochester247—do not provide a right to appeal a potentially 
dangerous designation.248 
Other ordinances demonstrate the host of ways Minnesota 
cities handle the administrative and financial costs of providing a 
right to a hearing on a potentially dangerous designation. For 
example, to appeal a potentially dangerous designation in the City 
of St. Paul, an animal owner must initially post a $50 fee to cover 
administrative costs of scheduling a hearing, and if the dog owner 
loses the appeal, the owner will be responsible for the actual 
expenses of the hearing, up to $1000.249 The City of Minneapolis 
requires the animal owner to pay $250 prior to receiving a hearing, 
but imposes no fee if the designation is upheld.250 Cities also reduce 
costs by holding hearings in front of hearing officers, or by 
accepting into evidence reports by animal control officers without 
requiring them to testify.251 
The City of Lino Lakes argued to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court that even though other cities provide hearings on a 
potentially dangerous designation, Lino Lakes should not be 
forced to incur additional fiscal and administrative burdens in 
providing additional process when, unlike these other cities, Lino 
Lakes did not place restrictions on potentially dangerous animals.252 
However, the City assumed that any ruling adverse to its position 
would require it to grant a hearing after the potentially dangerous 
designation. This is not the case, though, because a hearing on the 
 
 247.  Eden Prairie, Minnetonka, and Rochester adopted MINN. STAT. 
§§ 347.50–347.56 (2012), which only provide a right to a hearing for a dog 
declared “dangerous.” EDEN PRAIRIE, MINN., CITY CODE § 9.07 subdiv. 20 (2013); 
MINNETONKA, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 925.105(2)(b) (2013); ROCHESTER, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106A.18 subdiv. 2 (2013). 
 248.  The following fourteen city ordinances provide a right to appeal a 
potentially dangerous designation: APPLE VALLEY, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 91.20(C)(1) (2013); BLOOMINGTON, MINN., CITY CODE § 12.105(c) (2013); 
BROOKLYN PARK, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 92.25(B) (2013); COON RAPIDS, 
MINN., CITY CODE § 6-122(2) (2011); DULUTH, MINN., LEGISLATIVE CODE § 6-98 
(2013); EAGAN, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.11, subdiv. 7(C) (2012); EDINA, 
MINN., CITY CODE § 300.17, subdiv. 6(D) (2011); LAKEVILLE, MINN., CITY CODE 
§ 5-1-9(B)(1)(c) (2013); MAPLE GROVE, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-13(j) 
(2013); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64-110(f) (2013); PLYMOUTH, 
MINN., CITY CODE § 915.25, subdiv. 6 (2013); ST. CLOUD, MINN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 1040:80, subdiv. 2(a) (2009); ST. LOUIS PARK, MINN., CITY CODE 
§ 4-89(d) (2013); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200.11(b) (2013). 
 249.  ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200.12(b)(1) (2013). 
 250.  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64.110(f) (2013). 
 251.  See, e.g., PLYMOUTH, MINN., CITY CODE § 915.25, subdiv. 6 (2013). 
 252.  City’s Supreme Court Brief, supra note 68, at *3. 
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potentially dangerous designation would only be required once the 
designation was used as a predicate to deprive an owner of the 
property if his animal was declared “dangerous.” The various city 
ordinances providing a hearing on a potentially dangerous 
designation demonstrate that providing such hearings is common 
and not unduly burdensome. Cities would stop placing restrictions 
on potentially dangerous animals if the hearings were too 
burdensome. 
B. Alternatives to the Court’s Ruling: A Proposed Holding 
A better alternative to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Sawh can be summed up in the following holding: an individual 
has a due process right to a post hoc hearing to review the 
correctness of a government-issued warning notice, but only when 
the warning is later used by the government as a predicate to 
deprive an individual of property. 
This alternative holding better aligns with U.S. and Minnesota 
Supreme Court precedent in Bell, Mendoza-Lopez, and Wiltgen, along 
with the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Cowan, which all stand 
for the principle that where a government’s adverse decision is 
subsequently used against an individual as a predicate offense to 
deprive him or her of life, liberty, or property, then that individual 
has a due process right to review the correctness of the predicate 
offense.253 
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have also held that the 
post hoc review on a predicate offense must, at the earliest, be 
conducted at the hearing requested by the individual on the 
subsequent offense that can deprive the individual of their 
property. Due process requires that an individual be heard at a 
“meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”254 The meaningful 
time to be heard is when a warning, originally used by the 
government to give notice, is transformed into a predicate to an 
offense that can deprive the person of his or her liberty or 
property.255 
 
 253.  See supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 254.  Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 255.  The court in Cowan held that the defendant had a due process right to 
be heard immediately on the predicate vicious dog determination. State v. Cowan, 
814 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ohio 2004). However, unlike the potentially dangerous dog 
designation in Sawh, the vicious dog designation restricted Cowan of her property 
at its issuance. Id. 
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Whether a hearing allows an individual to be heard in a 
“meaningful manner” is context driven, because due process is 
flexible and “is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.”256 Because Sawh’s 
case involves classic adjudicative facts, a post hoc hearing to review 
the potentially dangerous designation should afford Sawh the right 
to present evidence in the form of testimony and exhibits. In 
accordance with multiple municipal ordinances, and Minnesota’s 
dangerous dog law, the trier of fact should be a hearing officer or 
an administrative judge who is neutral and impartial.257 Live 
testimony and a chance for cross-examination of city officials is 
preferable. Considering the financial burdens on cities, however, 
and the fact that a potentially dangerous designation could be 
challenged years later when it is used as a predicate offense, cities 
should be allowed to present evidence—such as police reports or 
animal control records—without further foundation.”258 However, 
cities should be required, as was the practice in Lino Lakes, to 
adequately document the reasons for the original adverse 
designation in case such designation is later used as a predicate for 
a subsequent offense.259 
This alternative holding satisfies the Mathews test. Allowing a 
post hoc hearing on the potentially dangerous designation only 
when the designation is used as a predicate at a subsequent hearing 
 
 256.  Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 
(1961); see also Brooks v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 584 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
 257.  See MINN. STAT. § 347.541, subdiv. 4 (2012) (requiring an impartial 
hearing officer); BLOOMINGTON, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 12.105(c), 
12.106(f)(1) (2013) (providing for an administrative law judge to oversee a 
hearing); DULUTH, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-98(c) (2013) (providing for an 
impartial hearing officer retained by the city to conduct the hearing); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64.110(f)(1) (2013) (requiring a 
hearing officer); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 200.11(b)(1) (2013) 
(same). 
 258.  See EAGAN, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10.11 subdiv. 7(C) (“[The] 
Rules of Evidence shall not be strictly applied.”); ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 200.11(b)(1) (requiring no foundation for city reports). 
 259.  But cf. Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of 
Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 157 (1983) (arguing that a requirement for 
a statement of reasons for any adverse issued decision against a person 
undermines administrative discretion and the freedom to rely on intuition and 
impressions to pursue institutional goals). Professor Simon’s critique of “reason 
requirements” can be distinguished because “intuition and impressions” are not 
useful for an animal control officer in determining whether a dog bit or attacked a 
person. 
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corresponds to Sawh’s weightier property interest in Brody as a 
companion animal.260 Such a hearing is valuable because it cures 
the substantial risk of an erroneous deprivation of property based 
on either an innocent mistake or an arbitrary decision by a city 
official in declaring Brody “potentially dangerous.” Finally, this type 
of hearing also recognizes cities’ interest in saving administrative 
resources and costs because most of the parties, witnesses, and city 
officials will already be present at the dangerous dog hearing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court was correct to find the Due 
Process Clause was not triggered at the time the potentially 
dangerous designation was issued. However, the court erred in 
determining that, once Sawh’s property could be restricted and 
deprived, Sawh had no due process right to be heard about the 
correctness of the potentially dangerous designation. 
Under the Mathews due process test, the court undervalued 
Sawh’s private interest in the life of his dog by relying on century-
old animal law precedent, which holds that the value of a dog, like 
other domesticated farm animals, is its fair market value. The court 
also erred in its construction of the City Code because its 
interpretation led to unreasonable results that are contrary to the 
purpose of the Due Process Clause: the protection of the individual 
against arbitrary state action.261 The court’s determination that the 
City Code only required the existence and not the correctness of 
the designation ran contrary to its own precedent in Wiltgen, U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent in Bell and Mendoza-Lopez, and the Cowan 
case from the Ohio Supreme Court. Sawh is sufficiently analogous 
to these cases, which stand for the proposition that to allow an 
unreviewed offense or adverse designation to be used as a 
conclusive predicate on a subsequent offense creates a substantial 
risk of an erroneous property deprivation, and violates the 
requirements of procedural due process. 
Because due process is flexible, the court should have 
determined under the Mathews test that Sawh had a due process 
right to a post hoc hearing on the potentially dangerous 
 
 260.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 261.  See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 
559 (1956)); supra Part II. 
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